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Gentlemen, I'm probably more out of place than 
any of your other speakers. Some have noted that 
they're chemists; some have noted that they're 
metallurgists. I have no research results tore-
port; I'm a bureaucrat, one of those hopefully nice, 
gray, faceless, beings from the Pentagon. I must 
ask your forebearance this morning if I seem.a bit 
obtuse; where I work a square corner has 108 degrees. 
Unfortunately, listening to your meeting I 
quickly concluded that my initial topic for this 
talk was unsuitable for this occasion. What follows 
is a different talk. My apologies for the mislead-
ing abstract. 
Now. the office I work in is charged with a 
rather odd problem: that of somehow arranging that 
the necessary resources: dollars, people, spare 
parts, whatever, are programmed and actuall1 deliv-
ered to make all of the various equipments which 
DoD buys ready to satisfactorily accomplish their 
purpose when they're called upon. This can be 
somewhat challenging at times. 
In Genesis we are told that God took six days 
to make the Heavens and the Earth, and apparently 
quality assurance was satisfactory because "behold, 
it was very good". As Secretary Brownman pointed 
out on Tuesday, it takes the Army considerably more 
than six years to buy a tank, and there is strong 
reason to doubt that the resulting product is very 
good at all, especially when you have to persuade 
someone to pry enough money out of a tightly con-
strained defense budget to maintain the beasts. 
Digging up the funds becomes more difficult every 
year, probably because it costs so much. This year 
DoD is spending somewhere between $15 and $20 bil-
lion just to maintain airplanes, ships, tanks and 
those other primary equipments which we buy. 
The point is that I'm one of the guys who are 
going to need all of those cute black boxes which 
you want to produce. Frankly, those devices are 
needed very badly. Let me talk a little about our 
problems. Perhaps these difficulties can serve as 
a challenge to some of the research managers here 
in thinking about their own programs and how to 
move them forwards. 
Several presentations about such topics as 
x-ray diffraction methods have mentioned potential 
benefits. They started me thinking about the time 
about ten years ago when a gentleman from MIT, who 
shall remain nameless, was convinced that aircraft 
operators should apply x-ray diffraction to the 
turbine blades in aircraft gas turbine engines. 
The Air Force and several airlines sent some of 
their best maintenance people to talk to him, as 
he explained that he could save millions of dollars. 
After several days of meetings, it was revealed that 
there were only two prerequisites to using this 
methodology: one of them was that all turbine 
blades be made out of a single crystal of metal, 
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and the second was that each single crystal turbine 
blade be reinspected in the identically same place 
on a daily basis. He was confident that operators 
should start observing reproducible results after 
taking some 800 to l ,000 sample observations on a 
given turbine blade. 
This process was very hard to justify to the 
maintainers. For some reason, DoD has not yet in-
vested in x-ray diffraction of turbine blades. 
Unfortunately, this example is not untypical of the 
problems of bringing NDE to the field. 
I got into this whole NDE business indirectly 
Mike Buckley, whom I don't see this morning--there 
he is. You made it up, Mike. Congratulations!--
got his name into an Aviation Week article which 
claimed near-miraculous savings as a result of his 
efforts. These were dangerous words. If you claim 
savings, somebody is going to try to subtract them 
from the already scarce dollars which my office is 
paid to care about. For this reason, I promptly 
picked up the telephone, called Dr. Buckley, and 
said, "Michael, wouldn't you like to come to Wash-
ington and explain how you calculated those savings?" 
Well, Mike came. And, we found that perhaps 
there were some serious questions as to whether 
such savings would be realized. This disconnect 
resulted from assumptions being made which might 
seem perfectly reasonable to a laboratory scientist, 
but which don't match operating and financial 
realities. 
For example, Mike pointed out how many dis-
assemblies and inspections he was going to get rid 
of. Well, my office has recently been engaged in a 
very small exercise to apply what the airlines call 
MSG-2--it stands for the Maintenance Steering Group 2--
methodology to aircraft maintenance. There is, in 
fact, a textbook in preparation; I have here Volume 
III, our "cookbook" in manuscript form. Applying 
MSG-2 has reduced the preventive maintenance on 
a typical military airframe by 50 percent and the 
total depot maintenance on aircraft engines to which 
it has been applied by more than 50 percent. Thus, 
MSG-2 eliminated many of the tasks Mike's improved 
NDE was going to do more efficiently. 
How was this done? MSG-2 does only three 
things. It asks the questions: (l) Will doing this 
task improve safety? (2) If it won't improve safety, 
is there an economic benefit? (3) If there is 
neither a safety nor an economic benefit, why do it 
all? 
Well, this seems a very simple form of disci-
pline to apply. However, it took a certain amount 
of formalization--if we could show the first view-
graph, please. (Figure 1) I '11 see if I can get 
over there without tripping over myself.--This 
example is that for the formal evaluation of air-
craft structures. All the discipline that was 
Figure 1. Reliability centered maintenance 
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arplied was to ask maintenance planners to ask 
themselves these questions in an organized manner. 
As you look at them you say, "You've got to be more 
quantitative than that." I wish we could be; I'd 
be very happy if we were. Perhaps you gentlemen 
can help us in becoming more quantitative. 
More importantly,,an analogy to this simple 
discipline should be applied to NDE development. 
One of the things that has been much reduced as a 
result of MSG-2 has been "on-condition" maintenance 
tasks, that is,tasks related to tests for reduced 
resistance to failure. Why has on-condition main-
tenance suffered? For one reason. It couldn't 
pass the test of simple questions. 
First question, can the test detect reduced 
resistance to failure for some spP.cific failure 
mode? Simple, but a very strong implication. You've 
not only got to detect something but you should also 
be able to relate what you detect to some failure 
mode. Many of the tasks didn't meet this criterion. 
They might 'detect something, but no one had any 
idea how to interpret or act upon the results. 
Second question, can the test anticipate that 
failure far enough in advance to permit effective 
response to correct the problem before actual fail-
ure? This is an important question. For example, 
there is the, perhaps apocryphal, proposal for 
an acoustic emission nondestructive test to warn 
the pilots of one well-known airoraft when the 
wings start cracking. Its only serious drawback 
was that the warning would occur only 8 to 20 
seconds before the pilot had to bail out. 
Fortunately, that device has been removed from 
modification planning. 
We are still suffering from another device, 
somewhat the opposite, which is known as the heli-
copter chip light. This marvelous nondestructive 
evaluator is installed in helicopter transmissions 
to measure whether metallic particles are being 
accumulated. There are only two problems with 
the helicopter chip light. First, its frequency 
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of Type II error (false accusal) is approximately 
20 times greater than its actual identification 
of real problems. Second, it gives you a minimum 
of ten hours warning before you should take cor-
rective action. 
Giving so much notice is fine except that some 
pilots. God bless them, get all kinds of distraught 
the moment that light goes on. They ground their 
airplanes immediately wherever they are. Sometimes 
in the middle of South or North Viet Nam. Some 
have crashed, killed themselves. The chip light 
has cost DoD at least 10 times as much damage as it 
has averted according to the best analysis I've 
seen. And, so far as can pe determined, it has 
little or no safety benefit. 
Now, it was good of the nondestructive evalua-
tion community to provide such a device. However, 
it would have been better if someone had thought 
enough to locate the readout someplace off the in-
strument panel so as to preclude accidents because 
the pilot had an unreliable ten hour warning that 
someone should inspect his transmission for possibl? 
problems. -
After that digression, we get to the last 
question about on-condition tests. Does the task 
have a greater likelihood of doing good than harm? 
This was certainly a problem with the chip light. 
Let me give you another example. 
For the C5A, the Air Force decided to do all 
kinds of oerformance trend analysis. To this end 
they installed a monitoring system called MADARS-
GPS on every C5. At Dover, whe're the greatest 
number of C5s are based, the principal cause of 
aircraft being "down" was failure of the monitori.ng 
system. Now, for every hour of tapes of the num-
erous variables which this monitoring system records 
on the airplane, it takes 16 hours of computer 
analysis time on a rather large machine. But, therE-
is no evidence that anyone has ever taken an effec-
tive action as a result. The fact that this expen-
sive airplane is now being grounded because an 
unproductive monitoring system isn't working well 
frightens me a little. 
Okay. Those are the prerequisites to get 
monitoring which works satisfactorily or, at least, 
is such that someone should be willing to pay for 
it. Those prerequisites are, as the gentleman who _ 
preceded me pointed out, going to be applied in an 
environment quite hostile to any device requiring 
sophisticated operators. As a result, I have gotten 
rather fatalistic. Dearly as I would like to see 
the daily maintenance burden reduced, most of the 
benefits of your work are going to be seen (and 
hopefully should be seen) in applications before 
the equipment is ever accepted. 
Now, we DoD logisticians have another small 
problem. Materials quality assurance is black 
magic to many, if not most, managers. Perhaps 
enough of us are not technically qualified to under-
stand the answer when we ask the question, "Will it 
do any good?" before spending money for NDI or NDE. 
We often are forced to act through mist or mystifi-
cation. 
However, I for one, am still curious why dye 
Jenetrant inspection, which detects flaws less than 
1/16" deep, is performed on billets before a half 
inch is shaved off each side. I'm equally unclear 
Js to why,of the numerous metallurqical tests re-
1Uired by MILSPEC. almost none seems to be re-
latable to any of the specific failures that we 
"xperience. Frankly, we need not only tests, but 
ve need tests that we can soundly and tightly re-
late to something that is failing or that will cause 
3 failure. 
To be direct: Please, before you go out and 
design a 35-pound black box that will do acoustic 
holography of titanium parts, think about how to 
relate the resulting acoustic holograms to some-
thing, anything. If you can't, don't really count 
on a market. Even DoD isn't dumb all of the time. 
Unfortunately, I'm not sure a disciplined 
answer to the questions I've raised is at all easy 
to arrive at. I think that it involves a lot of 
work; and it's going to take people in a number of 
fields ta1king to each other to get those answers. 
In e~sence, that's my message. Before quitting, 
waul d 11 ke to te 11 another horror story, because 
think it says something important. 
I was approached recently by a gentleman with a 
narvelous inspection technique that eliminated all 
disassemblies in inspecting the outer skin panel of 
a w~ng. There is only one problem with this appli-
:atlon. One still has to inspect the inner skin 
3anel; thus, disa~sembly is still required anyway, 
>nd the ne1·1 techmque saves nothing. It would 
3roba?ly cost an additional $10,000 per airplane. 
If, l1ke DoD, you have a 25,000 airplane fleet 
10,000 of which are potential users, that would 
~et expensive fairly fast. 
In spite of all these horror stories, DoD 
1eed~ no~des tructi ve evaluation. In proposing NDE 
!ppl1cat1ons, however, you should bear in mind that 
~he armed forces are not run by engineers, they are 
·un by people who have been oeprators. Operators usu-
illy do not understand the technologies embodied 
n their weapons systems and, as a result, are often 
very much afraid of technological change. In a 
number of studies, we have clearly documented their 
great hesitation to engage in anything that looks 
like it might be riskier. For example, even though, 
on an engineering basis, it was clear that the Navy 
should overhaul an F-4 aircraft at 48 month inter-
vals rather than every 24 months, it took 14 years 
from the time the engineers reached that conclusion 
to the time pilot managers were willing to accept 
it and permit it to happen. In short, your case 
had better be good, and you may need a bit of 
patience. 
I have had one other difficulty with what 
have heard here. Everyone has talked about costs; 
everyone talks about savings; occasionally, we talk 
about reliability. Reliability needs to be dis-
cussed. 
We're buying new weapons. We have to buy new 
weapons. Unfortunately~ it's a competitive world. 
and in a society which seems to find it very dif-
ficult to produce non-military work, the Soviets 
are beginning to produce very good weapons these 
days. 
Building those new weapons has all kinds of 
interesting implications. For example, to build 
a really effective VTOL aircraft, we will need gas 
turbine hot stages which operate 500 to 600 degrees 
Fahrenheit hDtter than present designs. I don't 
think anyone understands enough about how the 
materials that work at those temperatures fail. 
We're going to need means of testing new materials 
just to find out what their characteristics are 
and how they fail. Then we're going to need means 
of evaluating production materials to be sure they 
are within meaningful quality standards. 
Again and again when considering use of a 
material we must think not merely of its cost, but 
also of its reliability and how that reliability 
impacts on design capability. The real benefits 
from NDE, I'm convinced, will often not be cost 
savings; in fact, almost never cost savings. But, 
hopefully, NDE will benefit effectiveness, the 
ability to make the equipments we have work. As 
has been frankly discussed, they don't always work 
well now. And, NDE is clearly pre-requisite to 
the ability to design and manufacture equipments 
with new capabilities that really do work. That's 
a very different set of benefits than people have 
been talking about. 
Thinking about the likely pay-offs suggests 
that some variation in present development plans 
might be helpful. For example, much as it may be 
painful, researchers should start looking at tita-
nium instead of just aluminum. I was fascinated 
with the number of papers about aluminum. I have 
asked several speakers afterwards, "Why don't you 
look at titanium?" Their uniform reply was, "Well, 
it's difficult." It's di ffi cult, but that's where 
the problem is. 
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DISCUSSION 
DR. GEORGE MARTIN (UCLA): You mentioned the Russian equipment as being rather superior. How do the 
Russians handle their equipment inspection problems? 
DR. SMITH: Sir, I did not mention it as superior; I mentioned it as improving rapidly, as becoming com-
petitive. The Department of Defense would be loathe to admit that the Russian equipment was 
superior, and if I were to make such a statement I should promptly and deservedly be shot by my 
bosses. 
The problem of poor quality assurance in the Soviet Union has been well publicized. It is 
very clear that in certain of their newer weapons systems they are addressing the issue much more 
effectively than they ever have in the past. One can see this in the fact that we now actually 
worry about the counterforce effectiveness of their strategic missiles which suggests that they 
have met a very tight assurance equipment. And, one sees it in the fact that we begin to think 
the armor plate on their tanks might be good, which implies they have solved another quality 
assurance problem. 
The question is a different one. I think, than your rephrasing, and one would not wish to be 
quoted otherwise. I was noting that we find ourselves 1n a competitive environment. I would not 
want to evaluate, but certainly we are feeling the hot breadth of competition much more strongly. 
We are feeling it for a number of reasons. One of them is that you are now defended by an all 
volunteer force. In 1962 with many more men in uniform, the U.S. could devote more than 70 per-
cent of its defense monies to new procurement, R and D, etc. Defense now devotes over 55 percent 
of its monies to personnel. That leaves less than 45 percent for procurement, Rand D, etc. 
DR. GEORGE MAYER (Army Research Office): I guess I don't understand your objection to the chip detector. 
The question, number one, is: does it work? 
DR. SMITH: Very serious questions on that. The work I'm quoting, in fact, was done by and for Army's 
Air Mobility Research and Development Lab at Fort Eustis. 
DR. MAYER: Yes, but the point is, if it does work, then the factor of your warning light making your 
pilots crash--
OR. SMITH: Okay, but let's go the other way. 
DR. MAYER: --is simply a psychological one. 
DR. SMITH: That psychology may be lovely. It's a lovely black box, but if that psychology does me 
harm, sir, I don't want it. New. York Airways took on this same problem and solved it very nicely. 
They took the chip detector off of the instrument panel, put it on a servicing panel that had to be 
checked every time the helicopter landed. Helicopters don't have 10-hour flights so they had 
plenty of warning. By making this change, they produced a situation where chip detectors stopped 
frightening the pilots, without preventing action from being taken where it needed to be, by the 
maintenance personnel. 
DR. MAYER: I think that's fine, but this community here is mainly composed of R and E engineers and 
they're not going to determine where you put your warning lights. 
DR. SMITH: Sir, with all due respect, the real problem is that nobody seems to determine those things. 
If the instrument designer doesn't think about the user of his product, who else should? 
DR. KIRK RUMMEL (Boeing, Vertol): You threw some rather interesting challenges out to this group of 
engineers and scientists. I guess more than most of these I'm one of those people who try to 
make the system evaluations for those systems. Let me throw a challenge back to you. Given that 
we've done our homework, and maybe in many cases we haven't, and we've tried to do those evaluations 
rigorously, once we've reached that point and have great factors missing in our equation such as 
the cost of a maintenance man hour or where the problem is, there's many things that we certainly 
can't come up with that the operator can. Perhaps you could give us some advice of how we've run 
that system, and we've got a course of action which we feel we've done the right way and come up with 
the right answer, how do we tackle that red tape, that bureaucracy whose, I guess, inaction can 
best be described as inertia parading as caution? 
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DR. SMITH: Fair question. Two answers. You're from Boeing, Vertol; you know Tom House? 
DR. RUMMEL: I'm giving his paper. 
DR. SMITH: That's what I thought. Okay. One way to get action is to find an effective and interested 
agent in the bureaucracy and work through that office. Many of us bureaucrats really do care. 
In the helicopter business in the Army, the USAAMRDL ~t Fort Eustis, especially the group that 
Tom is associated with, probably has done a better job of looking systematically at the relation-
ship of design to operating and support costs than anyone else in DoD. In fact, I think the 
results coming out of that shop do tell us things like where the failure modes really are, where 
costs are, what we can do about them. That's where you get some of the answers you need to change 
your designs. In fact, some of those answers are reflected in your new designs, for example, the 
UTTAS which is really a remarkable aircraft from a support point of view, as is SIKORSKY's. 
Where I work, many people are trying very hard to put it in rather clea1· and stringent 
criteria on how to select a maintenance program. I've talked about some of these. It's a very 
simple set of criteria, and we are trying to take a number of steps to see that these are carried 
out and that the theoretical improvement will be realized. 
Fort Eustis, for example, is being listened to more now. Secretary Brownman, in fact, has 
had one briefing from Tom House and is due for more. We are making some headway there. 
I think the AF will have some dollars for emergent problems in its FY 78 budget. They even 
have a little bit of this kind of money in FY 1977. The revolution that is implied in that state-
ment probably seems very small to you gentlemen; however, I am wearing a suit partially because 
I have to cover the scars. Believe me, it is a very hard thing to do and the battle is only 
begun. At least, we're trying. 
If there is no friendly pocket of bureaucrats, you try to educate one. The Air Force now has 
a focused place for a man with a solution to contact, the PRAM SPO. Similarly, for Navy ships, 
the "RED/E" effort has a charter to change things. The Army is moving in a very positive direction 
right now. They are starting to apply some of the research results which we had all wondered if 
anybody ever read. Your best bet there is probably USAAMRDL. 
Maybe that's part of an answer. You asked a tough question. With an organization as big 
as DoD, you don't try to control very many details. I don't even think that approach is possible. 
Management of such a large organization has to be thought of in terms of entropy and thermodynamics. 
-- I'm not sure I want to be quoted and I wish the tape recorder weren't running, but --when you 
need to do something quickly in an organization like DoD you start by asking, "Well, where are 
we falling on our faces and what's going to make a difference?" Then you try to design short cir-
cuits around the system so as to do what needs to be done until the system catches up several years 
downstream. 
The Russians have a worse problem than we do on this. I have occasionally muttered that we 
should look at Lieberman's writings on putting incentives into the Soviet economy. Perhaps we 
could find something useful to DoD there. 
It is a problem; it's often not going to be solvable. If all else fails, give me a ring. 
My te 1 ephone number is (202) 697-6079. If you've got a case, I.' 11 be happy to hear from you; maybe 
I'll know someone who can help. 
DR. C. MOW: 
break. 
I'm sorry I have to cut the interesting discussion off. 
Thank you, Dr. Smith. 
OR. SMITH: Thank you. 
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You can continue during the coffee 
